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KEY SCHEDULING IN DES TYPE CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Lawrence Brown and Jennifer Seberry

Department of Computer Science
University College, UNSW, Australian Defence Force Academy
Canberra ACT 2600. Australia.

Abstract
This paper reviews some possible design criteria for the key schedule in a DES style cryptosystem. The key schedule involves a Key Rotation component. and the pennutation PC2.
Together these provide for a diffusion of dependency of ciphertext bits on key bits. Some
empirical rules which seem to account for the derivation of the key schedule used in the
DES are first presented. A number of trials were run with various key schedules. and
some further design rules were derived. An alternative form of key schedule was then
tested. This used either a null pe2, or one in which pennutations only occurred within the
inputs to a given S-box, and a much larger rotation schedule than used in the DES. This
was found to be as effective as the key schedule used in the current DES, and is proposed
for use in new cryptosystems.

1. lntroduction
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [NBS??] is currently the only certified encryption
standard. It has achieved wide utilization, particularly in the banking and electronic funds
transfer areas, and is an Australian standard [ASA85] among others. With the current
significant use of DES (especially in banking), there is interest in designing and building a
DES-type cryptosystem with an extended key length of either 64 (rather than 56) or 128
bits. This is one of • continuing series of papers [Brow88], [BrSe89], [PiSe89], [Piep89],
analysing aspects of the current DES, and indicating criteria to be used in the design of
future schemes.
This paper will concentrate on the design of the key schedule, which involves a key rotation component, and the pennutation PC 2. Together these provide for a diffusion of dependency of ciphertext bits in key bits. As a measure of effectiveness, Meyer's analysis of
output bit dependence on key bits will be used [MeMa82]. Some empirical rules for the
key schedule, derived previously [Brow88], will be presented. A discussion of some alternatives 10 the current schedule will be presented, followed by the results obtained from
testing a number of alternate schedules. A presentation of the implications from these in
the design of any extended DES type schemes will condude the paper.
2. The Key Schedule in DES
The central component of the DES cryptosystem is the function g. which is a composition
of expansion function E. eight substitution boxes (S-boxes) S. and a pennutation pl.
Function g has as inputs the plaintext [L(i-l).R(i-l)] from the previous round. and a selection of key bits K(i) (see Fig L). This may be written as:
g: R(i)

=L (i-I) <i> P (S (E(R (i-I)

<i> K(i))), L(iFR (i-I).

I A more detailed description of these functions may be frond in [NBs771. [ASA85j or [SePi88j.
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Fig 1. DES as a Mixing Function
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The key schedule in a DES algorithm is responsible for fonning the sixteen 48-bit sub-keys
K (i) used in the rounds of the encryption procedure. This function is important since if the
same key is used on successive rounds, it can weaken the resulting algorithm (see
[GrTu781. [MeMa821. [MoSi871. [MoSi861. and [ASA85]). In detail. the 64-bit key is permuted by PC 1. This permutation perfonns two functions: first it strips the eight parity bits
out, and then distributes the remaining 56 bits over two 28-bit halves C (0) and D (0). The
cryptographic significance of this permutation is questionable [DDFG831. Subsequently for
each round, each 28-bit register is rotated left either one or two places according to the following schedule (subsequently denoted KS):
Table 1 • Kev Schedule for DES

Round
Shift

Total

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 28

After the shift. the resultant 28-bit vectors are permuted by PC2 (which in fact consists of
two 28-bit permutations. each of which selects 24 bits) to form the sub-key for that round.
This permutation may be written in terms of which S-box each bit is directed to, as shown
in Table 2 (nb: an '" indicates an autoclave S-box input rather than a message input; an X
specifies exclusion of that bit).

,-------------------------,
Table 2 . Current DES Permutation Pel

c: 1 4" 2" 3 1· 2 4 3" X 2" I 3 41~ 2 4~

1 X 3 4 2 X 3~ 1 X 3 4 2

D: 8 6. 5 8. 6 7 X 8 S X 7 6 S" 8 X 7" 6 8. S 6'" 7 8657'" X S· 7

·2·
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The sub-keys K(i} may be written as;
K(i)=PC2(KS(U.i}}. whereU=PC1(K}

and

KS (U,i)

is the key rotation schedule for input block U at round i.

3. Empirical Key Schedule Design Criteria
In Brown (Brow881. some empirical design rules for the key schedule are presented. The
rules presented for permutation PC2 are (if the bits are sorted into ascending order of their

input bits):
• 1 bits pennuted to the same S-box input are no closer than 3 bits apart
• 2 bits pennuted to an S-box input must have a span from lowest to highest input bit

number of at least 22 of the 28 bits in each key half (alternatively. the average spacing must be at least 3 2/3)
• 3 bits pennuted to the selector bits a. f on a given S-box must not be adjacent in the
sorted list of input bits
• 4 bits not selected by PC2 must be at least 3 places apart

The design of the key schedule

KS

is obviously related to the design of PC2 by rules I and

4 given above. Brown notes that the key schedule KS ensures that:
• 1 each bit is used as input to each S-box
• 2 no bit is used as input to the same S-box on successive rounds

• 3 the t<ltal number of bits rotated is 56 (which implies that

K(O) = K(16}.

enabling the

decryption operation to use right shifts in reverse order).

4. Ciphertext Dependence un Key Bits
This analysis is complex, and is dependent on the choices of permutations P and PC2 as
well as the KS the key schedule2. To quantify this dependency. a 64' 56 array F, is formed.
in which element Fr[iJ] specifies a dependency of output bit XU) on key bit Uti). The

vector U is that formed after PCI is applied. ie U = PC l(K}. The number of marked elements in G, will be examined to provide a profile of the degree of dependence achieved by
round r. Details of the derivation of this matrix. and the means by which entries are propagated. may be found in (MeMa821. This analysis technique will be used as a measure of
effectiveness for possible key schedules. In particular, two criteria are used:
•

rate of growth of output bit dependence on key bits by any S-box inputs

•

rate of growth of output bit dependence on key bits by BOlli message and autoclave

S-box inputs
5. Alternatives for the Key Schedule
The purpose of the above rules in designing a key schedule may be summarized as fol~
lows:
to present each key bit to a message input, and to an autoclave input, of each S-box
as quickly as possible.
This is achieved by a combination of the key rotation schedule KS. the key pennutation
PC 2, and the function g = S.P E . Trials have been performed in which each of these is
2 bur. not (Ill permutations IP, FP and PC I, which only $erve 10 Rl:lIumber the plaintext, cipbetleXt. and key bit. MlpeWvely.
The Mlalym done in this paper ign<llCS these pennUWionl (or this I'eIIson.

-3•

Auscrypt90

Key ScheduUng in DES Type Cryptosystems

Brown, Seberry

varied in tum. to analyse the effect of each.
In addition to that underlying design purpose. there is a pragmatic decision on the size of
the key registers. In the current scheme. the key is divided into two halves. An alternate
form could be to have a single large key schedule register. We also wish to extend the size
of the key. in order to ensure it is large enough to withstand any foreseeable exhaustive
search style attack. One way of providing a measure of this. whilst still maintaining compatibility with existing protocols. would be to remove the notion of parity bits in the key.
and use all 64-bits. Combining these two ideas we have the following possibilities for PC 2:
28 -> 24 bit
56 -> 48 bit
32 -> 24 bit
64 -> 48 bit
Initially. a key schedule with the same form as the current DES was examined. in order
that comparisons with the effectiveness of the current DES scheme could be made. Having
obtained some guidelines from these trials. key schedules involving some of the alternatives were then tried.
6. Some Trials on New Key Schedules
In Brown [Brow88], some empirical design criteria for pennutation PC2 and the Key Rota~
tion Schedule were presented. The authors have subsequently used these rules to generate
a set of permutations PC2. Since all possible 28->24 bit permutations could not be tried.
permutations with the form shown in Table 3 were tried (that is all arrangements of the 4
excluded bits, subject to the rules set, were found). This fonn was chosen in order to distribute key bits to each of the 4 S-boxes being fed by each half of the key schedule as
quickly as possible. A total of 7315 permutations were found.
Table 3 - ronn or eenerated Permutations Pel
C:123412341234123412341234

D:567856785678567856785678

+xxxx
+xxxx

Ciphertext-Key Dependences (CKdep) tests on these pennutations produced results shown
in Table 4 (with comparisons to the current and worst case PC2 supplied for comparison).
,

Table 4 - Dependency or Ciphertext bits on Key bits
Usin! Current DES Permutation P and Key Schedule

Round

Sid PC2

WorstPC2

Generated PC2

Regular X 2

Regular X 1. X 3. X 4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

5.36
39.17
82.25
98.44
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

5.36
42.19
81.47
9129
9621
9955
100.00
100.00

5.36
38.50·39.06
80.25-82.37
96.65·98.66
99.55·100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

5.36
39.06
82.37
98.66
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

5.36
38.62
81.47
98.21
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

Some of these permutations perfonned better than the PC2 used in the current DES. The
best of these were selected. 15 being found. These 15 pennutations were all found to have
a special form. namely that the excluded bits always fell between bits permuted to S-box I
-4"
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and S-oox 2 (or 5 and 6 in the D-side). There are thus exactly 15 since 15 = 6C 4 • In order to
investigate these pennutations with a regular placing of the excluded bits, all 60 such permutations were generated. A CKdep analysis of these pennutations resulted in only two
results, one for pennutations with the excluded bit before a bit permuted to S-box 2 (Regular X 2), and one for the others (Regular X I, X 3, X 4). These results are also shown in
Table 4.
So far, we have used the first of the two criteria presented earlier, namely the growth of
overall bit dependence of output bits on key bits. If we now consider the alternate measure, namely growth in dependence of output bits on key bits by both message and autoclave S-box inputs, then the results become less clear. As shown in Table 5, whilst growth
of overall dependence is greater with the regular PC2's, growth of both is worse.
Table 5 - Dependency of Ciphertext bits on Key bits
Using Current DES Permutation P and Key Schedule
bv Both Messa e and Autoclave S-box Inputs

,

3

4

,

BOIh,Eithcr

BoIh,Eilher

BOIh,EiIb.,

36.50.122S

81.03,98.44

9S.87,lOO.O

.........

I

CKd~

BOIh,l!ilhet

""""

0.0,5.36

PC2._

0.0,5.36

0.0,42.19

33.71,8lA7

73.81,91.29

I'ClX I

0.0,5.36

0.22.38.62

29.9Ul.47

65.07,91.21

""Xl

0.0,5.36

OA!i,39.06

30.36,82.37

67.08,98.66

71.01.100.0

PC2X 3

0.0,5.36

OAS,39.06

30.13,81.92

66.74,9&.21

76.79,100.0

PC2X4

0.0,5.36

..........
2.01,39.17

0A!i.3!l.06

30.13.11.92

66.52.98.21

,

7

8

Bob.....

BOIh.Ei1her

99.33.100.0

100.0,100.0

100.0,100.0

84.38.96.21

92.86,99.$5

98.66.100.0

100.0,100.0

73.66,100.0

80.13,100.0

87.28",100.0

93.97.100.0

83.26,100.0

90.18.100.0

95.87,100.0

83.04,100.0

89.96,100.0

95.76,100.0

BO.3ti.loo.O

86.38,100.0

92.41,100.0

75.61,100.0

.........

A closer look at the structure of the regular pennutations shows that the autoclave input
bits are clustered, due to the method used to assigu them to S-box inputs. By altering the
order of inputs within each S-box, a more regular arrangement of autoclave inputs was
obtained. When these were tested, the growth of dependence on both was much greater,
thus emphasizing the importance of this criterion on the design of PC2.
To obtain an indication of the relative influences of each of the components in the key
schedule, a series of trials were run, in which each of the following three components were
varied with the specified alternatives:
P
based on the results in [BrSe891, two permutations P were used:
• the current DES P and
• a strictly regular permutation generated by a difference function on the S-box
number of [+1 -2 +3 +4 +2 -1]. Because of its very regular structure, the propagation
of dependencies may be more easily calculated.
PC2 from the above work, the 4 best performing regular PC2 were extracted. Then these
KS

were processed to provide three levels of clustering of the autoclave inputs.
the key variant in the key rotation schedule appears to be the distribution of shifts of
1 verses 2 places, A set of key schedules with various numbers of shifts of 1 initially
were derived as shown in Table 6.

·5·
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Table 6 • Trial Key Schedules
Round

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

KS
KS
KS
KS

2222222222 2 2 1 1
1222222222 2 2 2 1
1 12222222 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 11122222 2 2 2 2 2

KS

1
1
1
2
2

1
1
1
1
2

When this test was run, the following conclusions were made:
•

the current permutation P perfonned better, possibly because its less than regular
structure assisted the distribution of dependencies between the autoclave and message
inputs.

•

permutations PC2 with the best spread of autoclave inputs. performed best as
expected.
a key schedule with as many shifts of I initially performed best. This again would
appear to be a function of the best method for spreading bits to as many S-box inputs
as soon as possible.

•

7. Design Criteria for New Key Schedules
From the above results, the design principles for designing key schedules can now be summarized as follows:
The key schedule ensures that:
1
each key bit is used as input to each S-box in tum
2
no bit is used as autoclave inputs on successive rounds
3
no bit is excluded on successive rounds
4
the final key register value is identical to the original key register value (to enable
easy reversal of the key schedule for decryption)
8. An Alternative Key Schedule Design
In the design of the DES, small key rotations were used, which required the use of permutation PC2 to provide a fan-out of key-bits across the S-box inputs, in order to satisfy the
above principles. An alternative design can be envisaged in which a large key rotation
interval is used, along with a null PC2 (ie: so called worst case PC2), or a local pe2 which
only pennutes bits within each block of 6 S-box inputs. The two PC2 pennutations used
are shown in Table 7.
Table 7 • Null and Local Permutations pel
for Alternative Kev Schedule
C: 1'11111'2"'22222"'3"' 3333 3"' 4"' 44444"'XXXX
D: S' S S S S S' 6' 6 6 6 6 6"' 7"' 7 7 7 7 7"' 8"' 8 8 8 8 8"' X X X X

c; t"'11111"'2222·2.233.3"'3334·44444·XXXX
D: S. S S 5 5 S· 6666"' 6' 677.7"' 7 7 7 8' 8 8 8 8 8' X X X X

For this design, a constant key rotation of 7 bits was used, both because it is larger than
the number of inputs to an S-box. and because after sixteen rounds, the key register contents are the same as the original value (since 7· 16=112=4*28=2* 56), for both split key registers or a single large key register. This schedule is shown in Table 8.
.6-
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Table 8 - Alternative Constant Kev Schedule
Round
123456789 10 II 12 13 14 15 16

KS

7777777777

7

7

7

7

7

7

The results obtained for these PC2 permutations and this key schedule, using both a split
key rotation register, and a single key register, are shown in Table 9.
Table 9 - Dependency of Ciphertext bits on Key bits
Using Current DES Permutation P and the Alternative Key Schedule
by Both Messa e and Autoclave S-box Inputs
R_
1'C2

t

,

........... ..........

3

4

,

Balb.Eitbcr

BOIb.Eithor

BOIb.EiIher

....,....

7

•

B. ." " "

Botb.EiIb8r

•

Split Key Register Used

.'"

I<>0oI

O.o.s.36

1.56,39.06

M.82.82.03

76.56,9S.33

91.52,100.0

9&.21,100.0

100.0.100.0

100.0,100.0

....,.36

2.S7,39.116

38.17,12.03

13.12,98.33

91.21,100.0

100.0,100.0

100.0,100.0

100.0,100.0

Sins:Ie Key Rea:ister Used
,WI

,.,.

O.o,s.36

1.79,31.73

35.04,81.70

76.56,91.33

9IJ2,I00.0

91.21,100.0

100.0,100.0

100.0,100.0

O.oJ.36

2.79,31.73

38.39,11.70

83.11231.33

98.21,100.0

100.0,100.0

100.0.100.0

100.0,100.0

These results are very similar in performance to the key schedule used in the current DES
(see Table 5). The null PC2 performs slightly worse, whilst the local PC2 performs better.
Depending on the efficiency required, a tradeoff between best performance and ease of
implementation can be made between these. There is very little difference in performance
between the split and single key rotation registers, thus either could be chosen, depending
on other constraints.

9. Conclusion
The key schedule in the current DES has been analysed, and some empirical principles
which could have been used in its design derived. These were used to test a number of
alternative key schedules, which led to the development of a new set of genemlized principles to be used in the design of a new algorithm. An alternative key schedule which either
eliminates pennutation PC 2, or uses a local PC 2, was tried and found to be as effective as
that used in the current DES. This is thus suggested for use in any new algorithm.
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